Be Quick-but Don\u27t Hurry: Competing Purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act and Hall Street Associates v. Mattel by Fernandez, Keith Joseph
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 70 | Number 1
Fall 2009
Be Quick-but Don't Hurry: Competing Purposes
of the Federal Arbitration Act and Hall Street
Associates v. Mattel
Keith Joseph Fernandez
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Keith Joseph Fernandez, Be Quick-but Don't Hurry: Competing Purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act and Hall Street Associates v. Mattel,
70 La. L. Rev. (2009)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol70/iss1/12
Be Quick-but Don't Hurry: Competing Purposes of
the Federal Arbitration Act and Hall Street Associates
v. Mattel
"Be quick-but don't hurry" is an old adage attributed to the
great basketball coach, John Wooden.' Coach Wooden was likely
trying to teach his players to play both fast and confident while
avoiding the mistakes that accompany rushing. Though on its face
alternative dispute resolution has very little to do with basketball,
the aphorism holds form in the context of arbitration. As companies
become more specialized and supply chains swell, parties want
disputes to be settled quickly and amicably so that their relationships
and businesses can continue with minimal disruption.
Enter binding arbitration: the answer to quicker, cheaper dispute
resolution. Arbitration's great virtue is in its customization. It can be
tailored to be as quick and efficient or as thorough and reaching as
the parties desire within the broad confines outlined in statutes that
authorize such agreements. Some parties choose to provide for what
they have determined to be the best of both worlds: arbitration
subject to judicial review for errors of law. These parties wish for a
quick, cordial process, but one that is less susceptible to mistaken
conclusions of law. They want speed, but not at the expense of the
correct outcome. The United States Supreme Court has recently
hindered parties from striking their own balance between speed and
review by blocking the enforcement of expanded judicial review of
arbitral awards in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc. (Hall
Street).2
The purpose of this Note is twofold: first, to give relevant
background and history of the circumstances giving rise to the
Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street, and second, to take a
critical look at the effect of Hall Street on both federal and state
arbitration law. Part I of this Note details relevant background
information. Part II illustrates the competing lines of jurisprudence
leading up to the Hall Street decision. Part III lays out the facts and
opinion of the Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street and the
California Supreme Court's decision in Cable Connection, Inc. v.
DIRECTV. Part IV critically analyzes Hall Street by examining
whether it was the right case for this issue. Then, Part V argues that
the case has little effect on federal law because of the narrowness of
Copyright 2009, by KErTH JOSEPH FERNANDEZ.
1. John Wooden was the spectacular UCLA basketball coach who won ten
NCAA Titles. See ANDREW HILL WITH JOHN WOODEN, BE QUICK-BUT DON'T
HuRRY (2001).
2. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008).
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the holding. Finally, this Note shows that state arbitration laws will
become the focus of more legislative and judicial attention in light
of the California Supreme Court's response to the opinion.
I. FAA BACKGROUND: CONGRESS REACTS TO COURT HOSTILITY
TOWARD ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was created with the central
purpose of ensuring "that private agreements to arbitrate are
enforced according to their terms.",3 This policy is clearly set forth in
the substantive portion of the FAA, section 2. In enacting the FAA
to "abrogate the general common-law rule against specific
enforcement of arbitration agreements," 5 Congress also recognized
that the FAA furthers the purposes of both efficiency and
expediency.6 While the FAA usually serves both speed and party
autonomy concurrently, sometimes these purposes come into direct
conflict. The Supreme Court had determined that in such instances,
the policy of enforcing agreements controls.
8
In addition to section 2, the FAA has procedural provisions
detailing the process of confirming an arbitral award in federal
court. 9 Section 9 provides that if parties agree that a judgment of the
court shall be entered upon the award, an arbitration award "must be
confirmed."' 0 The only exceptions to this "must confirm" language
3. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 53-54
(1995) (citing Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Jr. Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 478-79 (1989)).
4. FAA Section 2 provides in pertinent part:
A written provision ... to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the
whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract,
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (emphasis added).
5. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
6. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985)
(citing H.R. REP. No. 96-68, at 2 (1924)).
7. See id.
8. Id. at 219 ("The legislative history of the Act establishes that the
purpose behind its passage was to ensure judicial enforcement of privately made
agreements to arbitrate. We therefore reject the suggestion that the overriding
goal of the Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious resolution of
claims.").
9. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11 (2006).
10. Id. §9.
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are provided for in sections 10 and 11.11 Section 10 provides that an
award may be vacated for the following grounds: (1) the award was
procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) there is evidence
of partiality or corruption among the arbitrators; (3) the arbitrators
were guilty of misconduct that prejudiced the rights of one of the
parties; or (4) the arbitrators exceeded their powers. 12 The section 10
grounds for vacatur are narrow and limited by design to further the
policy of keeping courts from using judicial review specifically to
prevent enforcement of arbitration agreements.
1 3
Section 11 allows a court to modify an award for one of the
following reasons: (1) a material miscalculation of the award; (2) the
arbitrators awarded on a matter not submitted to them, unless it is a
matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter
submitted; or (3) the award is imperfect in matter of form not
affecting the merits of the controversy. 14 The grounds for
modification are also exceptionally narrow, minimizing judicial
review of awards to matters of abuse of power or error in
calculation.
The advantage of agreeing to the procedural provisions of the
FAA is that the action is treated like a motion and not a normal
contract action for specific performance.'i As such, section 9
provides for a streamlined and expedited process for confirmation of
an arbitral award. The "[i]f the parties in their agreement have
agreed" language allows parties to displace the federal procedure
with a state court's procedure. 16 Because the FAA does not provide
independent federal court jurisdiction, 17 the vast majority of states
have passed some form of the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) to
allow their courts to confirm arbitral awards. 18 The UAA contains
almost identical language as the FAA with respect to grounds for
confirmation, vacatur, and modification of awards. 19
11. Id. §§ 10-11.
12. Id. § 10(a)-(d).
13. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1409 (2008) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
14. 9 U.S.C. § 1 1(a)-(c) (2006).
15. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1402.
16. See Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 476 (1989) ("There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a
certain set of procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the
enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.").
17. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26
n.32 (1983).
18. 7 GABRIEL M. WILNER, ET AL., DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
§ 2 (3d ed. 2008) (Forty-nine states have passed some form of the Uniform
Arbitration Act).
19. The UAA provides in pertinent part:
NOTE 3892009]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
In front of this historical and legislative backdrop appears Hall
Street.20 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case in order
to resolve a split among the circuits rearding contractually
expanded judicial review of arbitration awards. 1 Because arbitration
awards can be vacated or modified only for the narrow reasons laid
out in sections 10 and 11 of the FAA, the parties in Hall Street
contracted to have their arbitration award subject to modification for
an additional ground--error of law.22 Based on precedent alone, it
appeared the Supreme Court would enforce the agreement as
written.23 In a surprising about-face, the Supreme Court instead held
that the grounds for vacatur and modification under sections 10 and
11 of the FAA are exclusive, thus defeating the contractual intent of
the parties.
24
II. THE CONTROVERSY TIPs OFF: CIRCUITS BEGIN TO SPLIT
While there was split authority concerning whether judicial
review of arbitration awards could be expanded by contract, a
Upon [motion] to the court by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the
court shall vacate an award made in the arbitration proceeding if:
(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
(2) there was:
(A) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator;
(B) corruption by an arbitrator; or
(C) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to the
arbitration proceeding;
(3) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of
sufficient cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence
material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing
contrary to Section 15, so as to prejudice substantially the rights of a
party to the arbitration proceeding;
(4) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's powers;
(5) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated
in the arbitration proceeding without raising the objection under
Section 15(c) not later than the beginning of the arbitration hearing; or
(6) the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation
of an arbitration as required in Section 9 so as to prejudice substantially
the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding.
UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 23, 7 U.L.A. 77-78 (2009).
20. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1396.
21. Id. at 1402.
22. Id. at 1400-01.
23. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985);
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 53-54 (1995)
(citing Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 478-79 (1989)).
24. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1396.
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majority of circuits had ruled that such expansions were authorized
25
under the FAA. In one of the first and most defimitive opinions on
the subject, Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications
Corp., the Fifth Circuit held that parties may contractually modify
the standard of review of an arbitration award, stating "[s]uch a
contractual modification is acceptable because, as the Supreme
Court has emphasized, arbitration is a creature of contract and 'the
FAA's pro-arbitration policy does not operate without regard to the
wishes of the contracting parties. ,, 26 The Gateway court noted that
"[a]rbitration under the FAA is a matter of consent, not coercion,
and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration
agreements as they see fit."27 Lastly, the Fifth Circuit pronounced
the grounds for vacatur and modification in FAA sections 10 and 11
to be default provisions capable of being expanded by contract.
28
This reasoning was generally accepted by the Third, Fourth, and
Sixth Circuits with little question.
2 9
The First Circuit expanded on the Gateway reasoning in Puerto
Rico Telephone Co. v. U.S. Phone Manufacturing Corp.30 The
questions presented in Puerto Rico were whether and how parties
could contract for expanded judicial review. 31 The First Circuit
concluded that the grounds for vacatur could be expanded by
25. The First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits held that these
agreements were valid. See P.R. Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21
(1st Cir. 2005); Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287 (3d Cir.
2001); Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
21248 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997); Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms.
Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995); Jacada, Ltd. v. Int'l Mkgt. Strategies, 401
F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 2005). The Ninth and Tenth Circuits held that expanded
judicial review was invalid. See Kyocera Corp., v. Prudential-Bache Trade
Servs., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline, Inc., 254 F.3d
925 (10th Cir. 2001). The Second, Seventh, and Eight Circuits did not have a
definitive holding on the issue. See Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, (2d
Cir. 2003), Chi. Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chi. Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d.
1501 (7th Cir. 1991); Schoch v. InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2003).
26. 64 F.3d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995)).
27. Id. (quoting Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 57).
28. Id. at 997.
29. See Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 257 F.3d at 293 ("We now join with
the great weight of authority and hold that parties may opt out of the FAA's off-
the-rack vacatur standards and fashion their own (including by referencing state
law standards."); Syncor Int'l Corp., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21248 (an
unreported Fourth Circuit opinion holding the FAA's grounds for modification
and vacatur are expandable by contract, citing the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Gateway); Jacada, Ltd., 401 F.3d at 712 (holding by implication that one can
expand judicial review by agreement).
30. P.R. Tel. Co., 427 F.3d 21.
31. Id. at 23.
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contract. 32 The court continued, noting the inclusion of a generic
choice of law provision did not displace the judicial review limits
imposed by the FAA.33 Finally, the First Circuit declared that in
order to achieve displacement of the FAA grounds for vacatur, the
agreement must contain "clear contractual language."
34
The Ninth Circuit, in Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp.,
originally followed the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit.35 The Ninth
Circuit said:
Thus, we fully agree with the Fifth Circuit. Federal courts
can expand their review of an arbitration award beyond the
FAA's grounds, when (but only to the extent that) the parties
have so agreed. To do otherwise would make hostility to
arbitration agreements erumpent under the guise of
deference to the arbitration concept.36
However, in Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services
the Ninth Circuit, en banc, overruled its earlier holding in Lapine. 
3
Finding support in the decisions of the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits,38 the court held that parties are able to modify the process
of arbitration to best suit their needs but cannot go beyond the
grounds for vacatur provided in the FAA.39 In addition to the
problems created by the plain language of the FAA, the Ninth
Circuit found expanded judicial review unworkable because it
would decrease the speed and efficiency of arbitration, erode the
finality of arbitration awards by subjecting them to another layer of
review, and create jurisdiction by contract.0
The circuit courts fractured along the precise lines one would
anticipate. Courts allowing expanded judicial review supported the
32. Id.
33. Id. at 29.
34. Id. at 31.
35. Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997),
overruled by Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., 341 F.3d 987 (9th
Cir. 2003).
36. Id. at 889.
37. Kyocera Corp., 341 F.3d 987.
38. See Chi. Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chi. Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d.
1501, 1504-05 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that parties cannot contract for
expanded judicial review of arbitration awards under the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, while looking to the FAA for guidance); Schoch
v. InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785, 789-90 (8th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging that
expanded judicial review of arbitration awards is not yet a "foregone
conclusion" but resolving the case on other grounds); Bowen v. Amoco
Pipeline, Inc., 254 F.3d 925, 937 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding parties may not
contract for expanded judicial review of arbitration awards).
39. Kyocera Corp., 341 F.3d at 999-1000.
40. Id. at 998-1000.
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policy of enforcing agreements by their terms as the overriding
consideration. Courts that denied enforcement of such agreements
showed concern over the independence of the arbitration process
and uneasiness that federal court procedure could be written by
contract. Clearly, the United States Supreme Court would have to
impose uniformity on the body of arbitration law.
Ill. HALL STREETASSOCIATES V. MATTEL: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN
ENFORCING AGREEMENTS AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF ARBITRATION
AWARDS
A. Procedural Background
In many ways, Hall Street was not an ideal case to address the
issue of expanded judicial review of arbitration awards. Because of
its singular facts and procedural history, Hall Street is not easily
analogized to other cases. The conflict in Hall Street began with a
lease dispute between Hall Street Associates (Hall Street), lessor,
and Mattel, lessee.4' Interestingly, the lease agreement did not
contain an arbitration provision. Beginning in 1981, Mattel and its
predecessors used the leased property as a manufacturing site.43 In
1998, the well water of the site was tested and showed high levels of
trichloroethylene. 44 As more pollutants were found, Mattel
eventually stopped drawing from the well and signed a consent
order to have the Oregon Deoartment of Environmental Quality
provide for cleanup of the site.
In 2001, Mattel gave notice to Hall Street that it intended to
terminate the lease and vacate the premises.46 Hall Street brought
suit in the United States District Court of Oregon, contesting
Mattel's right to vacate on the date it had chosen and claiming a
right to indemnification for the cleanup of the site. In a bench trial
on the termination issue, Mattel ultimately prevailed.48 With respect
to the indemnification issue, Hall Street and Mattel attempted
mediation, which failed.49 The parties then agreed to arbitrate and
asked the district court to enter the agreement as an order.50 The
41. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (2008).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
2009] NOTE
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district court agreed to the wishes of the parties, approved the
parties' arbitration agreement, and entered the order.
In the arbitration agreement, the parties negotiated for and
agreed to a provision stating that the district court could vacate,
modify, or correct an award "where the arbitrator's conclusions of
law [were] erroneous." 52 Once submitted for arbitration, the
arbitrator decided for Mattel on the basis that the indemnification
clause requiring compliance with all applicable federal, state, and
local environmental laws did not compel compliance with the
Oregon Drinking Water Act (ODWA).5 The arbitrator explained
that the ODWA was not an environmental law because it dealt
primarily with human health as opposed to property
contamination.54 Thus, the ODWA was outside the purview of the
indemnification clause. 55
Hall Street then filed a motion with the district court to vacate
the arbitrator's award on the ground that not treating the ODWA as
an environmental law was an error of law.56 The district court, using
the standard for vacatur in the arbitration agreement, agreed, vacated
the award, and remanded the case back to the arbitrator for further
consideration. 57 The arbitrator followed the court's ruling and found
for Hall Street upon reconsideration. 58 Both parties then sought
modification of the second arbitration award. The district court
corrected the arbitrator's calculation of interest but otherwise upheld
the arbitrator's second award.59
After the confirmation of the corrected award, both parties
appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit. For the first time,
Mattel argued that the Ninth Circuit's decision in Kyocera Corp. v.
Prudential-Bache Trade Services61 prevented enforcement of the
parties' expanded judicial review provision. 62 The Ninth Circuit
reversed in favor of Mattel, ruling that expanded judicial review
provisions were unenforceable and severable. 63 The Ninth Circuit
instructed the district court to confirm the award unless it could be
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1400-01.
53. Id. at 1401.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003).
62. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1401.
63. Id.
394 [Vol. 70
vacated under FAA section 10 or modified under section 1 1.64 On
remand, the district court vacated the award for "implausible
interpretation of the lease."65 Implausibility not being a ground for
vacatur under the FAA, the Ninth Circuit again reversed on appeal.66
Finally, the United States Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari.67
B. The Majority Opinion
Justice Souter, who wrote the majority opinion in the six-three
decision,68 first addressed the notion that expanded judicial review
was impossible because it would "create federal jurisdiction by
private contract." 69 The Court, acknowledging that the FAA is
"something of an anomaly in the field of federal-court jurisdiction,"
pointed out that the FAA requires an independent jurisdictional
basis. 70 Because the FAA does not grant jurisdiction, Justice Souter
discarded the notion that enforcing an agreement's judicial review
provision would create federal jurisdiction by private contract. 71 The
Justice instead narrowed the issue to the scope of judicial review
permissible under the FAA.
72
Next, the Court addressed the mechanism for enforcement of an
arbitration award provided by the FAA's procedural rules-sections
9-11.73 An application for an order to confirm, correct, or modify an
award receives streamlined treatment under the FAA.74 Under
section 9, these types of applications are treated as motions,
eliminating the need for a separate, and more time consuming,75
contract action. Justice Souter noted that section 9, which contains
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1400-08 (2008) (J. Scalia joined as to all but
footnote seven).
69. Id. at 1402 n.2.
70. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 26 n.32 (1983)).
71. Id. at 1402 n.2. A federal court only has subject matter jurisdiction of a
claim if it falls under federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction. 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (defining federal question jurisdiction as "jurisdiction of
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States"); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) (defining diversity jurisdiction as a matter in
controversy exceeding $75,000 and involving diversity of citizenship, e.g.,
citizens of different states).
72. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1402 n.2.
73. Id. at 1402.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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the words "must" confirm "unless," 76 is not written like a default
provision that can be supplemented by contract.77
Hall Street argued against section 10 being the exclusive
grounds for vacatur by pointing to a supposed judicially-created
"manifest disregard" ground mentioned in a 1953 Supreme Court
78decision, Wilko v. Swan. Hall Street pointed to this decision as
evidence that the Court has recognized other grounds for vacatur
other than those explicitly set forth in the FAA.79 Justice Souter
noted that Wilko did not decide the issue of expanded grounds for
vacatur and dismissed the language as being mere dicta in a case
that had since been overturned on other grounds.8 0 Hall Street
maintained that if judges can add grounds to vacate (the "manifest
disregard" ground) to the FAA, then so too can contracting parties.81
Justice Souter torpedoed this reasoning by pointing out that the cited
"manifest disregard" language expressly rejects review for an
arbitrator's legal errors and may, in fact, just refer to all of the
section 10 grounds collectively.
82
,
Then, Hall Street argued that as a "creature of contract," the
arbitration agreement should be upheld according to the FAA's
primary purpose of enforcing agreements according to their terms. 83
For both textual and interpretive reasons, the majority read sections
10 and 11 as being exclusive. 84 Justice Souter disagreed with resting
the holding on the general purpose of the FAA because the act is
76. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2006) (providing in relevant part that "at any time within
one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the
court so specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court
must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as
prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title") (emphasis added).
77. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1405. For an example of permissive language in
the FAA, see 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2006).
78. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1403; Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37(1953) ("In unrestricted submissions, such as the present margin agreements
envisage, the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest
disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in
interpretation.").
79. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1403.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1404.
83. Id. (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220(1985); see also Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Jr. Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 478-79 (1989) ("In recognition of Congress' principal purpose of
ensuring that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their
terms, we have held that the FAA pre-empts state laws which 'require a judicial
forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to
resolve by arbitration."').
84. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1404.
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textually at odds with contractually expanded judicial review.85
Beyond the previously mentioned argument that section 9 is not
written as a default provision, Justice Souter further urged that the
grounds for vacatur could not be expanded to legal error because
such a reading of the statute would run contrary to the ejusdem
generis canon of statutory construction.86 Even if sections 9-11
were flexible enough to allow for modification by contract,
permitting vacatur for legal error would be out of the purview of the
statute's grounds for vacatur, as these grounds are limited to what
the majority categorizes as "egregious departures from the parties'
agreed-upon arbitration. '"
87
After dispensing with Hall Street's arguments regarding the
primary purpose of enforcing private parties' agreements, the
majority suggested that it "makes more sense" to read sections 9-11
as encouraging a national policy in favor of arbitration while
allowing just enough review to "maintain arbitration's essential
virtue of resolving disputes straightaway." 88 The Court saw further
expansion of judicial review of arbitration awards as destructive to
the arbitration process itself-relegating arbitration to an initial step
before traditional litigation.89
Finally, the Supreme Court suggested the narrowness of its
holding by stating "we do not purport to say that [sections 10 and
11] exclude more searching review based on authority outside the
statute." 90 The majority further stated that parties wishing this kind
of expanded review of awards "may contemplate enforcement under
state statutory or common law." 9 The holding of Hall Street is
limited "to the scope of the expeditious judicial review under
sections 9, 10, and 11, deciding nothing about other possible
avenues for judicial enforcement of arbitration awards. ' 92 Beyond
the possibility of seeking review based on state statutory and
common law, the Court acknowledged that this type of agreement
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1404-05. Ejusdem generis is "[a] canon of construction that when
a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase
will be interpreted to include only items of the same type as those listed."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 556 (8th ed. 2004).
87. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1404-05 (The §§ 10-11 grounds for vacatur and
modification for "[clorruption," "fraud, evident partiality," "misconduct,"
"misbehavior," "exceed[ing] powers," "evident material miscalculation,"
"evident material mistake," "award[s] upon a matter not submitted," and
"imperfect[ions]," are nothing like review of evidence and conclusions of law).
88. Id. at 1405.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1406.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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may be enforceable if it is entered into in the course of district court
litigation. 93 The Court left open the question of whether the
agreement should be treated as an exercise of a district court's
authority to manage its cases under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
16 9
4
With seemingly more questions created than resolved, the Court
remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit to explore whether this
agreement was within the district court's authority to manage
litigation. 95 While the Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth
Circuit's decision with regard to the exclusive nature of the grounds
for vacatur and modification of the FAA, this conclusion did not
dispose of the case.96
C. The Dissenting Opinions
The first of two dissenting opinions was penned by Justice
Stevens and joined by Justice Kennedy.97 Justice Stevens took
exception to what he saw as the majority's misuse of the history of
98the FAA. Justice Stevens pointed out that the FAA was passed to
overcome the general hostility courts had toward arbitration before
1925. 99 Based on this "settled understanding of the core purpose of
the FAA," Justice Stevens stated his belief that "the interests
favoring enforceability. . . are stronger today than before the FAA
was enacted." 100
Justice Stevens read the majority opinion as reaching its decision
based on the litigants "trading" an acceptance of limited judicial
review in exchange for expedited federal enforcement of their
arbitration award.'1 1 Justice Stevens stated that section 9 does not
require an application be given expedited treatment, implying that if
parties choose not to have expedited treatment they should be able
to get around the majority's exclusivity ruling. 162 The bottom line on
this point of reasoning is that if the parties do not avail themselves
of the expedited review under section 9, there is no longer a ground
93. Id. at 1407.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1408.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1408-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 1408.
99. Id. at 1409.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. This type of agreement would be entered into under 9 U.S.C. § 2 of
the FAA but would be enforced by a federal court as a contract action,
presumably.
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for the majority's tradeoff. With regard to the majority's application
of eusdem generis, Justice Stevens reasoned that the text of sections
9-11 does not compel an exclusivity3 reading-such a reading
defeats the core purpose of the statute. ° Justice Stevens suggested
that "a listing of grounds that must always be available to
contracting parties simply does not speak to the question of whether
[the parties] may agree to additional grounds for judicial review." 10 4
Justice Stevens colorfully explained that the FAA is best
understood as a shield against the courts from unduly interfering
with arbitration awards.' 0 r To use the FAA as a sword to "cut down
parties' 'valid, irrevocable, and enforceable' agreements to arbitrate
their disputes" is contrary to the FAA's essential purpose. 10 6
Because of his belief that the FAA's primary purpose is enforcing
parties' agreements, Justice Stevens stated that even if he believed
the issue of expanded judicial review was debatable, he would still
rule in favor of party autonomy. 10 7 Finally, Justice Stevens
expressed his disbelief as to why the Court would be unwilling to
enforce an agreement that does not violate any public policy.'0 8
Justice Breyer wrote separately to assert his agreement with both
the majority and Justice Stevens that the FAA does not preclude
enforcement of an agreement to expand judicial review of
arbitration awards. 10 9 Since both sides concurred on this central
point,1 0 Justice Breyer would not have remanded the case because
Mattel could not point to any "statute, rule, or other public policy
that the agreement might violate.""' Rather, Justice Breyer would
simply have instructed the court of appeals to affirm the arbitrator's
final award. 11
2
The majority and dissent mirror the very issues over which the
circuit courts split. On the one hand, the Hall Street majority focuses
on considerations of finality, efficiency, and expedience as well as a
desire to prevent arbitration from becoming a prelude for
103. Id. at 1409.
104. Id.
105. Id
106. Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
107. Id. at 1409-10.
108. Id. at 1410.
109. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 1406-07 (majority opinion) (noting that the FAA "is not the only
way into court for parties wanting review of arbitration awards"); id. at 1409-10
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the FAA is a "shield meant to protect
parties from hostile courts, not a sword with which to cut down parties' 'valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable' agreements to arbitrate their disputes subject to
judicial review for errors of law").
111. Id. at 1410 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
112. Id.
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litigation. i l3 On the other hand, the dissenting opinions are
concerned that the courts are not enforcing parties' agreements as
written, thus frustrating what Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Breyer
see as the primary purpose of the FAA. 1 4 The majority emphasizes
sections 9 and 10 as being controlling in this case. The dissent
understands section 2 and the policy of party autonomy as being the
central issues. In view of these competing purposes, Hall Street
exemplifies how a decision promoting expedient and efficient
decision-making in arbitration can frustrate party intent and
autonomy. 
15
The Hall Street decision represents a barrier to federal
enforcement of expanded judicial review clauses under the FAA.
Because the decision is not controlling with respect to state
arbitration laws, it is only natural that parties desiring more
searching review of their arbitration awards will move from federal
courts and the FAA to state courts and state arbitration laws. One
such case has already come before a state supreme court, and that
decision rejected the Hall Street reasoning.
IV. STATE LAW REJECTION OF HALL STREET
On August 25, 2008, the Supreme Court of California in Cable
Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV left no doubt that California
arbitration law permits expanded judicial review of arbitration
awards. 1 6  DIRECTV provides satellite broadcast television
nationwide through "sales agency agreements." '1 17 A class of dealers
113. See also Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., 341 F.3d 987
(9th Cir. 2003); Schoch v. InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785, 789-90 (8th Cir. 2003);
Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline, Inc., 254 F.3d 925, 937 (10th Cir. 2001); Chi.
Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chi. Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1504-05
(7th Cir. 1991).
114. See also P.R. Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 31 (1st
Cir. 2005); Jacada, Ltd. v. Int'l Mkgt. Strategies, 401 F.3d 701, 712 (6th Cir.
2005); Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2001);
Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21248
(4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514
U.S. 52, 53-54 (1995); Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Jr.
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478-79 (1989).
115. Certiorari may have been improvidently granted because this agreement
may have been outside of section 9 of the FAA. Because of the Supreme Court's
language regarding the applicability of Rule of Civil Procedure 16, this case
may have been better understood as a litigation management case and not an
FAA case.
116. 190 P.3d 586 (Cal. 2008) (at the time of this writing this is the first and
only state supreme court to address Hall Street with respect to state arbitration
law on the expanded judicial review of arbitration awards).
117. Id.at 590.
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sued DIRECTV in Oklahoma for wrongfully withholding
commissions and assessing improper charges." As provided by the
sale agency agreement, the Oklahoma court directed the parties to
submit the matter to arbitration in Los Angeles so the arbitrator
could determine whether the arbitration could be conducted on a
class wide basis." 9 The arbitration panel decided the class issue in
the affirmative.12
0
DIRECTV petitioned to vacate the award for an error of law-a
ground specifically included in the arbitration agreement. 2 1 The
trial court vacated the award, agreeing with DIRECTV. 122 The court
of appeal reversed, holding that reviewing an arbitration award for
legal error exceeded the trial court's jurisdiction and that provisions
authorizing such review are unenforceable.123 Finally, the California
Supreme Court granted a petition for review.
124
The California Supreme Court ruled that expanded judicial
review provisions were enforceable under the California Arbitration
Act's (CAA), procedures for vacatur, confirmation, and
modification.1 25 The court directly addressed the issue of federal
preemption by ruling that "the FAA's procedural provisions are not
controlling, and the determinative question is whether CAA
procedures conflict with [FAA section 2]. " 126 Finding no conflict in
either the FAA itself or the Hall Street decision, the California
Supreme Court determined that the United States Supreme Court did
not intend to affect state court procedures with the limits it imposed
on the FAA's procedures.
127
Turning to the CAA's procedures, the California Supreme Court
found that expanded judicial review has a basis in the statutes. 128
The court enforced the provision, utilizing section 1286.2(4), which
states that an award can be vacated if the arbitrators exceeded their
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 591.
121. Id. at 590 n.3 ("The arbitrators shall not have the power to commit
errors of law or legal reasoning, and the award may be vacated or corrected on
appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction for any such error.").
122. Id. at 591.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 599; see CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1286-1286.8 (West 2007 &
Supp. 2009).
126. Cable Connection, 190 P.3d at 598.
127. Id. at 599 (noting that the Supreme Court unanimously left open the
possibility of other avenues of enforcement).
128. Id. at 600.
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power. 19 This reasoning is in direct contrast to the Hall Street
decision that glossed over the "exceeded power" ground as just
another in a line of "egregious departures" from the arbitration.
130
By expressly limiting the power of the arbitrators in its arbitration
agreement, DIRECTV was able to have its expanded judicial review
clause enforced under the CAA.13 1 Interestingly, the court
recognized that expedience is only a virtue for those who seek it,
noting that "the parties. . . are best situated to weigh the advantages
of traditional arbitration aainst the benefits of court review for the
correction of legal error."'
V. HALL STREET'S IMPACT: A TECHNICAL ANSWER, NOT
NECESSARILY A SOLUTION
Hall Street's peculiar factual and procedural history made it
unsuitable for deciding the issue of expanded judicial review. Since
judicial review of arbitration awards naturally implicates policy
considerations of the judiciary and arbitrators, one must critically
evaluate the policies at stake in agreements authorizing this type of
review. Hall Street will also undoubtedly affect the law and
arbitration processes on both the federal and state level. This section
will examine Hall Street's practical effects on judicial review of
arbitration awards and some possible solutions to alternate
enforcement in different forums.
A. A Critical Look at the Decision
What makes Hall Street particularly unfortunate is the fact that
the original lease did not call for arbitration-the parties agreed to
arbitrate after litigation had begun. 133 Considering the parties
negotiated during litigation for arbitration, it is unlikely they would
have agreed to the provision absent a clause for judicial review of
129. Id. at 600 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (4) (West 2007 &
Supp. 2008) ("The arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be
corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy
submitted.")).
130. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404-05 (2008).
131. See Cable Connection, 190 P.3d at 590 n.3. Candidly, this appears to be
a hyper-technical reading of the statute's power of the arbitrator clause in an
attempt to distinguish Cable Connection from Hall Street. Cable Connection
may be best understood as a rejection of the reasoning in Hall Street. It was
within the power of the Califomia Supreme Court to reject the reasoning of Hall
Street and interpret its state law as consistent with judicial review for arbitration
awards.
132. Id. at 604.
133. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1400.
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the arbitrator's award. 134 The peculiar facts of this case also make
Hall Street less than ideal for deciding the issue of expanded judicial
review of arbitration awards. Hall Street argued in its supplementary
brief and at oral argument that the expanded judicial review
provision was not even an action under FAA section 9.135 Instead,
Hall Street urged that the case be treated as a "federal district court
action in which the court entered as its order the parties' stipulation
to arbitrate certain issues with legal-error review., 1 36 Because the
agreement to arbitrate between the parties was approved and entered
as an order by the district court, this type of action could be viewed
as within a district court's power to manage a case under Rule 16 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 137 If this agreement is indeed
outside of section 9 (Hall Street is pressing the issue on remand) 13
8
then it may have been more appropriate to dismiss the case, as the
exclusivity of FAA section 9 was not before the Court.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the Hall Street decision is
the Court's use of sections 9-11-sections that were originally
understood to keep courts from meddling with arbitration
decisions' 39 to ultimately undo the intentions of the parties. As
Justice Stevens explained, the limited grounds for vacatur,
modification, or correction in sections 10 and 11 were to protect the
integrity of the arbitration process from the courts. 14 0 The fear at the
time the FAA was passed was that broad judicial review could
render the arbitration process impotent and unnecessary as courts
would ultimately have the last word on disputes without this
protection."14 In Hall Street, the ultimate irony is that in order to
134. This assumption is based on the fact that Hall Street brought its action in
district court originally. The parties negotiated and agreed to this particular
provision as a condition of moving to arbitration. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel,
Inc., 113 F. App'x 272, 273 (9th Cir. 2004); Petitioner's Supplemental Brief at
4, Hall St., 128 S.Ct. 1396 (No. 06-989).
135. See Petitioner's Supplemental Reply Brief at 1, Hall St., 128 S. Ct. 1396
(No. 06-989); Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Hall St., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (No.
06-989).
136. Petitioner's Supplemental Reply Brief, supra note 135, at 1.
137. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1407 (the Court recognizes an alternate approach
under these facts may be possible because of the district court's order). See FED.
R. Civ. P. 16 (this rule governs a federal court's power with respect to pretrial
conferences, scheduling, and case management). This Note will not address
whether judicial review of an arbitration award for errors of law is possible
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It will instead focus on the effect of
the Hall Street holding on arbitration agreements that are not approved by a
court beforehand.
138. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1407-08.
139. See id. at 1409 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1409 n.3.
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"protect" the integrity of the arbitration process and ensure the
finality of the award, the Supreme Court ruled in a manner that
destroyed the arbitration process as agreed upon by the parties and
was contrary to the purpose of section 2 of the FAA.
142
In its opinion, the Court expressed concern that arbitration will
become "merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-
consuming judicial review process."'143 Unfortunately for Hall Street
and Mattel, that is precisely the setup they desired at the beginning
of their dispute. By specifically contracting for expanded judicial
review, it is evident that both Mattel and Hall Street were willing to
sacrifice some of the finality, speed, and cost benefits of the
arbitration process in order to hedge against the risk that the
arbitration award may be granted on an erroneous conclusion of law.
Interestingly, Mattel did not argue-nor did the Supreme Court
address-the possibility of expanded judicial review standing
contrary to public policy. Courts cannot be expected to make
accurate conclusions of law without appropriate and detailed judicial
fact-finding.' 44 In some cases, it may be unclear from the outset
what facts will be important for a court to properly apply the law. If
an arbitrator did not make a finding crucial to the application of the
law, a court will be unable to determine if an error of law was made.
The Supreme Court has noted that arbitrators have "no
obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award.' 45 The
First, Second, and Seventh Circuits have held that arbitrators are not
even required to make formal findings of fact. 146 Agreements that
allow a court to vacate an award for an error of law bring into
question the arbitration process itself. If formal findings of fact need
142. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (Arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract").
143. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1405.
144. Robert Pitofsky, Arbitration and Antitrust Enforcement, 44 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1072, 1076-77 (1969) (arguing that arbitrator decisions are unsuitable for
judicial review in the antitrust context). But see John R. Allison, Arbitration
Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced Accommodation of
Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C. L. REv. 219, 240-44 (1986) (examining the
arguments about the effects of arbitrator decisions on antitrust claims, including
creating a void of precedent, a lack of guidance for businesses, and difficulty in
determining if a policy is furthered or frustrated by arbitration).
145. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
598 (1960).
146. Raytheon Co. v. Automated Bus. Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir.
1989). See also Koch Oil, S.A. v. Transocean Gulf Oil Co., 751 F.2d 551, 554
(2d Cir. 1985) (settled that "arbitrators may render a lump sum award without
disclosing their rationale for it"); Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 653
F.2d 310, 312 (7th Cir. 1981) (settled that "arbitrators may render a lump sum
award without disclosing their rationale for it").
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to be made, parties are pushed further from arbitration and closer to
full-blown litigation. This, of course, could lead to courts requiring a
detailed reasoning of arbitrators' decisions in order for courts to
ascertain how the law was applied. As court involvement increases
in this process, arbitration becomes a new species of judicial
litigation. It becomes more practical for a court to have sole
jurisdiction, thus ensuring it has all the information needed to
correctly apply the law. 1
47
An argument can be made that a court should be amenable to
overseeing an arbitrator's conclusions of law before it can be
"forced" by contract to do so. That concern, however, does not
appear to underlie the decision in Hall Street since the Court alluded
to other avenues to get precisely the amount of judicial review of an
arbitration award that the contract provision in this case sought to
obtain. 148 Also, while the concern that courts may be "forced" to
review arbitration awards exists in some cases, the district court in
Hall Street approved the agreement and entered it as an order
evidencing its amenability to the provision. 149
The Court also purported to protect the integrity of the parties'
arbitration awards from rogue courts.' 5° Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court is protecting the parties from the very "evil" they sought when
negotiating such a provision. The argument that this decision
protects those who seek the benefits of the arbitration process is
specious when applied to a case like Hall Street. Because parties
must contract for an agreement expanding the grounds for vacatur, a
nonexclusive ruling on the FAA grounds does not authorize courts
to review all arbitration awards for errors of law-only those awards
where the parties have agreed to such review. As a procedural
device, these agreements allow parties to get precisely the amount of
court involvement they want in their arbitration process if the parties
clearly evidence such an intention. Utilizing the framework
provided in Puerto Rico Telephone Co., the Court could have
allowed parties to displace the FAA standard of review by using
147. Another interesting phenomenon that could occur is the creation of "two
appeals of right." The first appeal would be the lower court reviewing the
arbitrator's decision. The second appeal would be the appeals court reviewing
the lower court's decision. The possible issues created here are outside of the
scope of this Note.
148. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1406-07 (review of this sort may be enforced
under state statutory or common law, or under a court's power to manage cases).
149. Id. at 1400.
150. Id. at 1405 ("There is nothing malleable about 'must grant,' which
unequivocally tells courts to grant confirmation in all cases, except when one of
the 'prescribed' exceptions applies.").
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clear contractual language, allaying any fear of unwanted judicial
interference in arbitration. 1
It is, perhaps, the ironic nature of the Hall Street opinion that
causes the most cognitive dissonance. The majority intended for its
decision to protect the expectations of the parties that arbitration
agreements are final and binding. 152 In order to effectuate that result,
the Court had to defeat the expectations of the parties by not
enforcing their contract according to its terms. 153 In addition to
contradicting the parties' contractual intentions, this decision
promotes the speedy resolution of claims for parties who would
prefer extra review to speed. To rule that FAA sections 10 and 11
are merely threshold provisions for vacatur and modification that
can be expanded by contract does no harm to those parties who
desire the fastest and most binding forms of arbitration. Parties that
wish to arbitrate would simply have another option to tailor their
agreements to meet their needs.
B. Hall Street: Not an End, Merely a Stumbling Block to Judicial
Review ofArbitration Awards
The Supreme Court acknowledged its inability to predict the
practical impact of its decision on arbitration. 5 4 Hall Street and its
amici 15 5 argued that an exclusivity reading would drive parties away
from arbitration because it would reduce the flexibility and utility of
the process. 156 Mattel, along with its amici, 157 argued that parties
will flee from the courts, presumably to later use the courts to obtain
the proverbial "second bite of the apple."'158 Regardless of what the
net effects are on arbitration in general, it is clear that parties who
still favor more searching review of arbitration awards will be
151. P.R. Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 31 (st Cir. 2005).
152. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1405.
153. For a critical look at the contradictory nature of a decision against
enforceability of expanded judicial review, see Tom Cullinan, Contracting for
an Expanded Scope of Judicial Review in Arbitration Agreements, 51 VAND. L.
REv. 395,422 (1998).
154. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1406 ("We do not know . . . whether the
exclusivity reading of the statute is more of a threat to the popularity of
arbitrators or to that of courts.").
155. Including the Pacific Legal Foundation, the New England Legal
Foundation and National Federation of Independent Business Legal Foundation,
and CTIA-the Wireless Association.
156. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1406.
157. Including the American Arbitration Association and the United States
Council for International Business.
158. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1406.
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required to look for procedures and enforcement outside of the
FAA.
Hall Street alludes to a few different enforcement options for
parties seeking more searching judicial review 1 59 First, parties may
be able to bring their action under state law.' A state law action
necessarily implicates federal preemption by the FAA. The FAA's
substantive provision was intended to create uniform federal
substantive law of arbitration that preempts inconsistent state law.'
6 1
Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court has never held that
the FAA's procedural provisions apply in state courts.! 62 The
Supreme Court has not directly addressed the preemptive effect of
sections 9-11; however, the language of these sections is directed to
application in the federal courts.1" Therefore, it appears unlikely
that enforcement of an expanded judicial review clause under state
law would be barred by federal preemption.
The second issue to be examined with respect to state law
enforcement is whether the statutes authorizing state arbitration
contain "textual features at odds with enforcing a contract to expand
judicial review following the arbitration." 4 States that have
adopted the UAA are susceptible to a similar textual reading as that
made by the Supreme Court in Hall Street. Adding to the
uncertainty and further complicating commercial planning, the
UAA's comments to section 23 directly address why an "opt-in"
provision for expanded judicial review was left out during the latest
159. See id. ("The FAA is not the only way into court for parties wanting
review of arbitration awards: they may contemplate enforcement under state
statutory or common law...
160. Id.
161. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983) ("Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or
procedural policies to the contrary. The effect of the section is to create a body
of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration
agreement within the coverage of the Act.").
162. Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 477 n.6 (1989) ("[W]e have never held that §§ 3 and 4, which by their
terms appear to apply only to proceedings in federal court, see 9 U.S.C. § 3
(referring to proceedings 'brought in any of the courts of the United States'); § 4
(referring to 'any United States district court'), are nonetheless applicable in
state court."); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1984) ("[W]e do
not hold that §§ 3 and 4 of the [Federal] Arbitration Act apply to proceedings in
state courts. Section 4, for example, provides that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure apply in proceedings to compel arbitration. The Federal Rules do not
apply in such state court proceedings.").
163. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2006) ("[s]uch application may be made to the United
States court in and for the district within which such award was made").
164. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1399.
2009] NOTE 407
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
revisions completed in 2000.165 The UAA cites inconsistent federal
law, preservation of the finality of arbitration awards, and the
existence of appellate arbitration panels as reasons an "opt-in"
provision was omitted. 166 These comments, while not dispositive-
and clearly not law-give some ammunition in UAA states that the
grounds for vacatur, modification, and correction are exclusive, just
as in the FAA.
Unlike the California case, Cable Connection, the agreement in
Hall Street did not place an error of law outside the arbitrator's
power: it merely directed the district court to vacate, modify, or
correct the award for an error of law. 16 7 Although likely
unsuccessful in light of the ejusdem generis argument set forth by
the majority in Hall Street, parties that do not contemplate having a
state forum for the enforcement of their arbitration agreement
(maritime actions, for instance) may be able to use a clause like the
one in Cable Connection to obtain the enforcement of their
agreement under the FAA. 16 8 By defining an error of law as outside
the arbitrator's power under the agreement, it may squeeze judicial
review of errors of law into the narrow grounds of section 10 of the
FAA.
The Cable Connection decision may change the behavior of
some parties that use judicial review provisions. Sophisticated
parties may forum shop for the most favorable state arbitration law.
In order to obtain the arbitration process that is most consistent with
the parties' view of alternate dispute resolution, these parties will
now likely look to the most permissive state law, creating a "race to
the bottom" among the states.' 69 The Supreme Court has stated that
"[a]rbitration under the [FAA] is a matter of consent, not coercion,
and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration
agreements as they see fit." 7° In fact, the Court has gone as far as to
say that parties may specify "by contract the rules under which that
arbitration will be conducted. Where ... the parties have agreed to
abide by state rules of arbitration, enforcing those rules according to
165. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 23 cmt. B, 7 U.L.A. 78 (2009).
166. Id.
167. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1400-01.
168. Id. at 1404-05.
169. See Ligget Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558-59 (1933) (Brandeis, J.
dissenting) Justice Brandeis coined the idea of a "race to the bottom" among the
states in the context of corporate law. As states began competing among each
other to make themselves more attractive to businesses for revenue generating
purposes, many states began to remove "safeguards" in their corporate
organization statutes. Other states would respond in kind to compete with these
changes in corporate law, leading to a race to the least restrictive rules.
170. Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S.
468,479 (1989).
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the terms of the agreement is fully consistent with the goals of the
FAA." '171 Parties willing to sacrifice some speed, convenience, and
finality for additional assurance that the decision has been made in
accordance with the law may find themselves contracting for
California's substantive and procedural law under the CAA.
Practically speaking, Hall Street and Cable Connection divide
the world into three classes of parties seeking judicial review of
arbitral awards. First, there are California parties seeking judicial
review of their arbitration awards. Those parties must be clear in
displacing the FAA rules of procedure with those of the CAA to
avoid the Hall Street ruling. Second, there are those parties outside
of California seeking to avoid Hall Street by using their own state's
arbitration act. Those parties should take care to explicitly displace
the FAA's procedures with those of their state's arbitration rules.
While this will not guarantee enforcement, it will sidestep the Hall
Street decision, directing the state court to apply and interpret state
law, not the FAA.
Finally, there is a third class of parties that do not contemplate a
state court venue. Those parties that either choose to use the federal
courts or must use a federal forum (e.g., maritime parties) should
avoid Hall Street's narrow holding by declaring expressly that the
parties do not agree to the expedited section 9 procedures. Further,
"federal forum" parties can attempt to limit the power of the
arbitrator expressly, like the parties in Cable Connection, but this is
simply a hyper-technical argument 7 2 that may be moot in light of
the ejusdem generis argument. 73 Any party that would not want
arbitration without the expanded judicial review should include in
the agreement that the review clause is not severable. By declaring
the clause nonseverable, a court decision holding that expanded
review is not possible in its jurisdiction would destroy the whole
agreement to arbitrate.
VI. CONCLUSION
Hall Street purports to have "resolved" a circuit split among
federal courts, but in actuality it has merely shifted the battleground.
Prior to Hall Street, circuits were split on the exclusivity of FAA
sections 9-11. Following Hall Street, a split may well develop as to
whether expanded judicial review provisions are authorized by
section 2 (as opposed to section 9) or Federal Rule of Civil
171. Id.
172. See supra text accompanying note 129.
173. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1404-05.
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Procedure 16.174 The Supreme Court has addressed the technical
question of the exclusivity of FAA sections 9-11 without addressing
the fundamental policy question of whether courts should be the
overseers of arbitration awards.1
75
Hall Street has undoubtedly thrown state arbitration laws
without clear "opt-in" judicial review provisions into doubt by
leaving the possibility open for state enforcement, while denying, or
at least partly denying, federal enforcement. Finally, the Hall Street
decision did not have occasion to rule on whether parties may place
an error of law outside the power of the arbitrator by contract, thus
allowing possible judicial vacatur for an error of law under FAA
section 10(d). 176 Ultimately this decision will prompt state action,
either judicial or legislative, to clarify the issue of expanded judicial
review, as well as federal action, in order to test the limits of the
decision. For those parties who still want a process that is quick but
does not hurry, perhaps they would do well to heed another adage of
the "Wizard of Westwood," John Wooden. "Don't let what you
cannot do interfere with what you can do."'177 Although the section 9
procedures are "out-of-bounds" for parties seeking judicial review
of their arbitration awards, there are still alternate routes for
enforcement.
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174. See id. at 1406-07; see also supra text accompanying note 137.
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